Taiwan's tech companies must find their voice in Washington (Nikkei - June 12, 2026)

Jason Hsu is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute. Patrick Wilson is the founder of Semiconductor & Innovation Group, a Washington-based consultancy.

Taiwan's economic ties with the U.S. have never been stronger. Taiwan is now America's fourth-largest trading partner, with bilateral goods and services trade totaling roughly $256 billion.

That represents a remarkable transformation. A generation ago, American companies turned to Taiwan primarily for low-cost manufacturing. Today, Taiwan is an economic and technological powerhouse -- a global leader in semiconductors, artificial intelligence, quantum computing and advanced manufacturing. No one in Tokyo, Brussels, or Washington questions its centrality to the industries that will define the next century.

Taiwan's diplomatic achievements match its economic ones. Facing relentless pressure from Beijing, this resilient democracy has cultivated deep relationships across every Western capital. In Washington, only Israel and the U.K. rival the special ties Taiwan has built with American elected leaders over three decades. That record of diplomatic success is genuinely impressive.

And yet something critical is missing. Despite pledging an additional $250 billion in U.S. investment-spanning semiconductor fabrication plants in Arizona, science parks in Texas, and major commitments in energy and AI, Taiwan is still on the outside looking in. U.S. President Donald Trump has alleged that Taiwan "stole" the American semiconductor chips and has described a $14 billion arms package as a "point of leverage." Taiwan's firms did everything the administration asked and more, yet they still find themselves wondering whether their partners truly have their backs.

The reason is straightforward: Taiwan lacks a powerful business voice in Washington. Unlike Japan, South Korea, Germany or the U.K. -- whose major corporations compete aggressively for political influence in the U.S. capital -- Taiwan has no equivalent corps of CEOs and executives pressing its case. There is no sustained corporate presence to defend Taiwan's billions in direct investment, to correct false narratives about its role in the global supply chain, or to defend Taiwan's business interests and remind American policymakers that Taiwan's success is inseparable from American competitiveness.

This absence is not accidental. Taiwan's business culture has long rewarded a posture of discretion due to its characteristics of manufacturing: let the customer take the credit, stay out of the limelight, and focus on delivering excellent products. That philosophy helped Taiwan build world-class companies. But in the current political environment -- one where no administration in the modern era has been more attentive to what business and finance leaders think -- it is a costly liability. By ceding the debate to rivals and adversaries, Taiwan's companies are harming their own shareholders and undermining the democratic order that makes their success possible.

TSMC is the instructive exception. Indispensable to global commerce and central to competitiveness, TSMC CEO C.C. Wei has stood beside Trump to announce a $100 billion U.S. investment -- and TSMC is treated accordingly: as a strategic partner, not a trade problem. Yet even TSMC only opened its Washington office in 2020. The lesson is clear: engagement works. The cost of disengagement is to have your interests defined by people you have never met.

U.S. President Donald Trump listens to C.C. Wei, chairman and CEO of TSMC, as they make an announcement about the company from Taiwan's investment at the White House in Washington on March 3, 2025.   © Reuters

The false narrative that Taiwan "stole" America's semiconductor industry illustrates the danger of that disengagement. The truth is the opposite: the fabless model that defines Silicon Valley was a deliberate strategic choice made in American boardrooms, driven by investor pressure to outsource manufacturing and boost short-term profitability. Taiwanese firms filled the gap that American capital created. Without a sustained Washington presence to make that case -- loudly and repeatedly -- a damaging myth has taken hold, and Taiwan is paying a political price for it.

Correcting that requires more than hiring a government relations firm. Taiwan's companies must treat Washington as a market that demands the same sustained investment, local presence, and strategic patience as any other major market. That means four concrete steps.

• First, build real teams. Washington outposts staffed by junior representatives cannot substitute for senior leadership with decision-making authority and long-term mandates.

  
  

• Second, invest in relationships before crises arise. Engaging think tanks, trade associations and members of Congress only during emergencies forfeits the credibility that comes from showing up consistently during the quiet stretches when trust is built.

  
  

• Third, coordinate across firms. Taiwan's collective story is far more compelling than any single company's. Taiwanese firms should align their advocacy so their voices reinforce rather than fragment each other's messages.

  
  

• Fourth, invest in ideas. Research, public commentary and advisory relationships allow American policymakers to understand what Taiwanese firms actually do, why they matter to American competitiveness and what the consequences of getting policy wrong would be.

  
  

Taiwan is a trusted ally and an indispensable partner to the U.S. But there remains a significant gap between its economic weight and its political voice. Closing that gap is not merely a business imperative -- it is a strategic one. Those who understand how American public policy is made can shape the next decade of U.S.-Taiwan economic relations.

By not being at the table consistently, Taiwan finds itself often on the menu. It is past time for Taiwan's companies to step forward and claim the seat at the table they have already earned.

Note about the authors: Hsu previously served as an elected legislator-at-large in Taiwan's Legislative Yuan from 2016 to 2020, where he focused on defense, technology, trade and foreign policy. Wilson, a former U.S. Commerce Department senior official, served until earlier this year as vice president of government relations for MediaTek Inc., Taiwan's second-largest company by market cap.